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Felder: Medicaid Funding for Abortions: The Medicaid Statute and the Equa

MEDICAID FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS:
THE MEDICAID STATUTE AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Blanket proscriptions of abortions by state statute were invalidated by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.' However, many
states have subsequently enacted regulations which limit the use of
Medicaid funds 2 to therapeutic abortions and to the expenses incident to live births, thereby prohibiting such use for nontherapeutic,
or elective, abortions. 3 Many such regulations have been attacked as
violating both Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 4 which estab-

lished Medicaid, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 5 The Supreme Court recently upheld two such regulations. In Beal v. Doe,6 the Court held that the Medicaid statute
allows, but does not require, the states to provide Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions. In Maher v. Roe, 7 the Court held
that a regulatory scheme which failed to fund elective abortions,
while funding therapeutic abortions and live births, does not violate the equal protection clause." This note analyzes the implications of these decisions for the Medicaid statute, the right to privacy established in Wade, and the equal protection clause.

1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Medicaid funds are grants to states for medical assistance programs. These
grants are governed by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1397f (1970 & Supp. V

1975).
3. Elective abortions are generally deemed not "medically necessary." This
characterization usually means that there is documented medical evidence that continuation of the pregnancy will not threaten the health of the mother. See Beal v.
Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2369 n.3 (1977). The regulations at issue in Beal v. Doe, id., defined health as including psychological, physical, emotional, and familial factors,
which must relate to the "well-being" of the mother. See id. at 2374 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The regulations upheld in Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977), included
"psychiatric necessity" within the term "medically necessary." See id. at 2378 n.2.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No state shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
7. 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
8. In Poelker v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977), a companion case to Beal v. Doe,
97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977), and Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977), the Court held that it
is not unconstitutional for a public hospital to refuse to perform elective abortions.
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THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE ABORTION

The Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade9 that the constitutionally protected right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 10
However, this right is not absolute, because the state has important interests in the regulation of abortion." But, because the right
of privacy is "fundamental," such state interests must be "compelling" to justify limiting the abortion decision. 1 2
The Court identified two state interests that become compelling at specific points during pregnancy. 13 The first is the interest
in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman. 14
This interest does not become compelling until the end of the first
trimester of pregnancy because the mortality rate for first trimester
abortions is lower than the mortality rate for normal childbirth. 15
Regulation of the abortion procedure during the second trimester
was therefore allowed if it relates to the "preservation and protection of maternal health." 1 6 The second state interest recognized as
compelling is the interest in "protecting the potentiality of human
life." 17 This interest becomes compelling at viability, which the
Supreme Court defined as the point at which the fetus is capable of
"'meaningful life outside the mother's womb."' 8 Therefore,
state
regulation aimed at protecting fetal life may proscribe abortion subsequent to viability, unless an abortion is necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother.' 9 During the first trimester, the attending physician in consultation with his patient is free to determine, without regulation by the state, that in his medical judgment
the patient's pregnancy should be terminated.

9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. Id. at 153.
11. Id. at 154.

12. Id. The Texas criminal abortion laws at issue in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), did not further a "compelling state interest," and therefore were declared
unconstitutional. These laws prohibited abortions that were not performed based on
medical advice to save the life of the mother. Id. at 164.
13. See id. at 162.
14. Id.

15.

See id. at 163.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 163-64.
Id.
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THE STATUTORY ISSUE

Title XIX of the Social Security Act established Medicaid, a
program administered by the states which provides federally
funded medical assistance to the needy.2 0 State participation, while
not mandatory, must satisfy certain requirements. Medical cover-

age must be extended to the categorically needy. 21 This group includes indigent persons with dependent children, the aged, the

blind, and the disabled.2 2 Other indigents, designated medically
needy, may receive Medicaid benefits at the discretion of the
states. 23
Aside from these and other minimal requirements, 2 4 the
states have wide discretion in designing their medical assistance

plans. 2 5 Several courts and commentators have relied on the
congressional intent to give the states wide discretion to reach

the conclusion that the statute does not require the states to fund
nontherapeutic

abortions.2 6

For example,

in Doe v. Wohlge-

20. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 286
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See also Beal v.
Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2369 n.1 (1977).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See also Beal v.
Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2369 n.1 (1977). The states must provide the categorically needy
with Medicaid funding for five categories of medical treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(B) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). These categories include inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, other laboratory and X-ray services, skilled nursing facility services, and physicians' services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1970 &
Supp. V 1975). The skilled nursing facility services category includes early periodic
screening, diagnosis, and treatment of minors, and family planning services, and
family planning supplies. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See also Beal v.
Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2369 n.1 (1977).
24. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text; notes 36-51 infra and accompanying text.
25. The states are not required to provide funding for all medical treatment
included in the five categories that must be provided to the categorically needy. See
note 22 supra and accompanying text. But state Medicaid plans must "include
reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical
assistance under the plan which ... are consistent with the objectives" of title XIX.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (Supp. V 1975). The states are also authorized to provide the
categorically needy with funding for 12 types of medical treatment in addition to the
five categories that they must fund. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
If a state elects to cover the "medically needy," it may either provide them with the
five types of medical care that must be extended to the "categorically needy," or it
may provide them with any seven of the authorized categories of treatment. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
26. See, e.g., Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975); Doe v. Wohlgemuth,
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muth, 2 7 the court confronted a Pennsylvania regulation which provided Medicaid assistance only for abortions which had been certified medically necessary by physicians. The court principally relied on Dandridge v. Williams,28 in which the Supreme Court deferred to state discretion in administering programs under the Social
Security Act by upholding a Maryland regulation that limited the
total amount of aid one family unit could receive under Aid for Families with Dependent Children. The district court in Wohigemuth
reasoned that, given Congress' silence with respect to Medicaid
funding for abortions, the great latitude conferred on the states in
administering programs under the Social Security Act compelled the
conclusion that the refusal to provide Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions did not violate the Social Security Act.29
Roe v. Norton"° concerned a Connecticut Welfare Department
regulation which limited the provision of Medicaid benefits to
those first trimester abortions which were "medically necessary." 3 '
The Second Circuit recognized that the Medicaid statute allows
participating states to fund elective abortions, 32 because Medicaid
funding is not limited to services that are medically necessary." 3
376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977); Note, Medicaid and the Abortion Right, 44
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 404 (1976).

27. 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S.Ct. 2366 (1977). While the district court concluded
that the statute did not require the states to fund elective abortions, it nevertheless
held that the Pennsylvania regulation at issue violated the equal protection clause.
The Third Circuit reversed the finding below on the statutory ground alone, holding
that the statute did require such funding, and therefore did not reach the constitutional question. See Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366
(1977). This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct.
2366 (1977).
28. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
29. Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 183-84 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified
sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S.Ct. 2366 (1977). See
also Note, Medicaid and the Abortion Right, supra note 26.
30. 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975).
31. See Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1975).
32. This holding reversed the district court's determination that the Medicaid
statute required the states to fund elective abortions. See id., rev'g 380 F. Supp. 726
(D. Conn. 1974). After deciding the statutory issue, the appellate court remanded
the case to a three-judge district court for resolution of the constitutional issue. On
remand, the three-judge court held that the regulation at issue violated the equal
protection clause. See Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), rev'd sub
nom. Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2376 (1977). This decision was then reversed by the
Supreme Court. See Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2376 (1977). See also text accompanying
notes 75 & 76 infra.
33. The view that Medicaid funding is only authorized for "medically neces-
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Even if the Medicaid statute does limit payments to medical services which are "necessary," elective abortions could be covered
because they are "medically necessary." The court reasoned that
pregnancy is a condition which requires medical attention. This
condition can be treated either by carrying the pregnancy to term
or by procuring an abortion. Neither choice can be deemed more
necessary than the other.23 However, the Second Circuit based
its holding that the statute does not require states to fund nontherapeutic abortions on the illegality, in most states, of elective
abortions when Congress enacted the Medicaid statute. Thus, the
court reasoned, it could not be presumed that Congress intended
to require Medicaid funding of nontherapeutic abortions, in light
of the conditions and circumstances that existed at the time of the
passage of the statute and in the absence of statutory language regarding abortion and35 legislative history supporting coverage of
abortion by Medicaid.
Other courts have concluded that the Medicaid statute does
require states to fund nontherapeutic abortions because of the limitations placed on the discretion of participating states by the statute. 36 This reasoning was used by the Third Circuit in Doe v.
sary" services emerges from the statute's declaration that the Medicaid program enables "each State ... to furnish ... medical assistance . . . [to] individuals, whose

income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. V 1975). The court in Norton found that the phrase
'necessary'... . In particular, the detailed statutory definition of 'medical assistance'
*.. contains no reference to medical necessity .... " Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928,
eligible is always described simply as 'medical assistance' without the adjective
'necessary'. ... In particular, the detailed statutory definition of 'medical assistance'
. . . contains no reference to medical necessity .... "' Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928,
933 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726, 728-29 (D. Conn. 1974))
(citations omitted); accord, Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct.
2366 (1977); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976).
34. Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 1975); accord, Doe v. Beal, 523
F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp.
1072 (D.N.H. 1976); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
35. Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 935 .(2d Cir. 1975); accord, Doe v.
Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523
F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977); Note, Medicaid and the Abortion Right, supra note 26. The lack of congressional intent to require Medicaid funding of nontherapeutic abortions is also indicated by the congressional enactment of
an amendment to the 1977 appropriations bill for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department of Labor which prohibited the funding of
abortions not necessary to protect the life of the mother, see Departments of Labor
and Health, Education, and Welfare, Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439,
§ 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976).
36. See Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977);
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Beal. 3 7 Unlike the Second Circuit in Norton, the Third Circuit in
Beal believed that the Medicaid statute only extended coverage to

"'medically necessary" treatments. 38 However, the court rejected

Pennsylvania's argument that because nontherapeutic abortions are

"elective," Medicaid funding cannot be provided for them. 39
A further restriction on state discretion in administering medical assistance programs is title XIX's requirement that medical assistance be equitably distributed among its recipients. 40 The Third
Circuit concluded that the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions

from Medicaid coverage violated this requirement. The court
reasoned that since funding was provided for full-term deliveries

and therapeutic abortions, the failure to provide funding for elective abortions required pregnant Medicaid recipients to choose the
"least voluntary method of treatment" ' 41 for their condition. Since
no other class of recipients was subject to such a constraint, the

court concluded that Pennsylvania's refusal to fund elective abortions violated the Medicaid statute's equality requirement.42
The court in Beal found further limitations on state discretion
in the Medicaid statute's requirement that the states use "reasonCoe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976); Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140
(D.S.D. 1975).
37. 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977). This decision was
later reversed by the Supreme Court. See Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977). See also
notes 52-74 infra and accompanying text.
38. See Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366
(1977).
39. See id.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
41. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 622 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
42. See id. See also Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072, 1084 (D.N.H. 1976);
Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140, 143 (D.S.D. 1975). The court in Coe agreed with
the court in Beal that by funding only therapeutic abortions and live births, the states
violated the equality provision of title XIX by differentiating between pregnant
Medicaid recipients and all other recipients. Indicative of this differentiation is that
only pregnant Medicaid recipients are required to establish the existence of "medical necessity" to receive a chosen treatment. The regulation at issue in Coe was also
objectionable because it differentiated between "women who elect and women who
are under medical constraints to terminate their pregnancies." Coe v. Hooker, 406 F.
Supp. 1072, 1084 (D.N.H. 1976). The court in Coe found no legitimate justification
for denying certain pregnant women a service that is extended to those pregnant
Medicaid recipients who meet the state's moral prerequisites for an abortion. For a
different interpretation of the equality requirement, see Note, Medicaid and the
Abortion Right, supra note 26, in which it is suggested that the Medicaid statute's

equality mandate is not violated by the failure to fund nontherapeutic abortions because the requirement only mandates equality as to the amount, duration, and scope
of services extended to recipients; such restriction therefore allows a specific type of
service, such as elective abortion, to be excluded, as long as it is excluded for all.
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able standards," consistent with the objectives of the Medicaid Act,
43
to determine the types of medical services that they will fund.
According to Beal, two statutory objectives that the states must
further are (1) allowance of considerable physician discretion in
choosing how to treat the patient and (2) economy. 44 The court in
Beal reasoned that because Pennsylvania funds therapeutic abortions and live births, it "has determined, in its discretion, that pregnancy is a condition for which medical treatment is 'necessary'
within the meaning of Title XJX." 45 No justification for limiting a

physician's discretion by preventing him from treating pregnancy
with a nontherapeutic abortion was found. 46 Furthermore, economy was not an acceptable rationale for this limitation because, "in
most cases non-therapeutic abortion is the cheapest method of
treatment. "47 Protection of the recipient's health 48 was also deemed
an insufficient justification as "the state itself admitted . . . that

non-therapeutic abortion is the least dangerous alternative for the
pregnant woman, at least during the first trimester. 49 Thus, the
court in Beal concluded that the failure to fund elective abortions,
while funding nontherapeutic abortions and live births, violated
the statutory mandate that participating states serve the objectives
of the Act,50 as well as the equality requirement. 51 The Pennsylvania regulations were therefore invalidated as inconsistent with
the Medicaid Act.
The issue of whether title XIX mandates provision of Medicaid
funding for elective abortions was finally resolved by the Supreme
Court in Beal v. Doe.5 2 Justice Powell, who wrote the majority

opinion, limited his analysis to the requirement in the statute that
43.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

44. See Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S.Ct. 2366
(1977).
45. Id. at 621.
46.

Id. at 620-22.

47. Id. at 622 (citation omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citation omitted).
50. See id. Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H.1976), also held that the
failure to fund nontherapeutic abortions violated the mandate in the Medicaid statute
that a state plan must include reasonable standards for determining the extent of
Medicaid coverage which are consistent with the objectives of the Act. Coe found
the denial of Medicaid for elective abortions to be inconsistent with the objectives of
economy, physician discretion, and provision for services in the best interests of the
recipients. See id. at 1080-83.
51. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
52. 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977). For the prior history of this case, see note 27 supra.
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the states adopt standards for determining the extent of medical
assistance which are both reasonable and consistent with the objec53
tives of the Act.
The Supreme Court identified the primary purpose of the Social Security Act: to "'enabl[e] each State, as far as practicable
under the conditions in such State, to furnish . . . medical assistance [to] individuals . . .whose income and resources are insuffi-

cient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.' "-54 The
Court stated in dictum that this provision placed a heavy burden
on the states to justify failure to provide assistance for necessary
medical services, asserting that "serious statutory questions might
be presented if a state medicaid plan excluded necessary medical
treatment from its coverage .

. . ."55

However, no such problems

were raised by the Pennsylvania regulations at issue, because, in
the majority's view, nontherapeutic abortions are "unnecessarythough perhaps desirable-medical services." 5 Thus, the regulations were held to be consistent with the objectives of the stat57
ute.
The Court then analyzed respondents' argument that the regulations are unreasonable. While the Court did not contest that
nontherapeutic abortion is generally a safer and less expensive
medical procedure than childbirth, the Court did not agree with
respondents' reasoning that the denial of Medicaid funding for
nontherapeutic abortions is therefore unreasonable under title XIX.
Rather, the Court held that the state's interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life recognized in Roe v. Wade58 included a
"valid and important interest in encouraging normal childbirth," 59
which continues throughout the pregnancy. This interest justifies
regulation of the abortion decision as long as such regulation does
not unduly burden the right to choose abortion.60 The Court would
not "presume that Congress intended to condition a State's participation in the Medicaid Program on its willingness to undercut [its
strong and legitimate interest in encouraging childbirth] by subsidizing the costs of nontherapeutic abortions." 61
53.
54.

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Ct.'2366, 2371 (1977) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§

1396 (Supp. V

1975)).
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. See id.
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2371 (1977).
60. See id. at 2371-72.
61. Id. at 2372 (footnote omitted).
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The decision of the Court in Roe v. Wade62 does not support
its later conclusion in Beal that the state has a legitimate interest in
encouraging childbirth throughout the pregnancy, thereby permitting interference with the abortion decision. According to Wade,
the interest in fetal life does not become sufficiently compelling to
justify regulating the abortion decision until the fetus is viable. 6 3
Therefore, state interference with the abortion decision prior to
viability was proscribed. Thus, Beal's view that Wade stands for the
proposition that the state's interest in potential life exists throughout the pregnancy, thereby allowing the state to interfere with the
abortion decision prior to viability, albeit in a manner that is "less
burdensome" than the criminal sanctions at issue in Wade, is not
supported by the language of Wade.
Furthermore, the Court's finding that the Pennsylvania regulation constitutes a substantially less burdensome interference with
the abortion decision than the criminal abortion law invalidated in
Wade is unfounded. As Justice Marshall noted in dissent: "Medicaid recipients are, almost by definition, 'completely unable
to pay for' abortions .....
64 Similarly, Justice Brennan stated in
dissent that the failure to extend Medicaid benefits to elective
abortions will "result as a practical matter in forcing penniless pregnant women to have children they would not have borne if the
State had not weighted the scales to make their choice to have
abortions substantially more onerous." 65 Although not noted by the
dissenters, denying Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions is
an inappropriate method of promoting childbirth because such denial only affects a narrow class of people. Only poor women who do
not desire children are forced to give birth. Those women who can
afford elective abortions are in no way encouraged by this regulatory scheme to carry their pregnancies to term.
The Medicaid statute contains no explicit language regarding
the funding of elective abortions. Its language and provisions give
rise to many possible interpretations. This is evidenced by the variety of decisions as to whether or not the statute compels the
funding of elective abortions and by the various analyses that dif-

62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. See id. at 163.
64. Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2397 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dissenting
opinion for three companion cases).
65. Id. at 2376 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2398 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting opinion for three companion cases); Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 118-19 (1976).
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ferent courts have used even to reach similar conclusions.6" The
Supreme Court relied on one provision in the statute-that the
states adopt reasonable standards for determining the extent of
medical assistance which are consistent with the objectives of the
Act 67-- to support its finding that the funding of elective abortions is
not required. In so doing, it ignored other provisions that could
justify the opposite result. For example, the Court could have
agreed with the Second Circuit in Norton that the statute does not
limit Medicaid funding to necessary medical services. 6 8 Or, the
Court could have found, as did the Third Circuit in Beal, that
abortion is a necessary medical service. 69 It also could have determined that the Pennsylvania regulation violates the equality requirement of the Medicaid statute.7 0 In analyzing whether the regulation at issue is consistent with the objectives of the statute, the
Court could have considered, as did the Third Circuit below, 7 1 the
objectives of economy and of affording considerable physician discretion. 72 Instead, the Court focused on only one statutory objective: granting the states discretion in providing medical assistance
to the indigent. 73 The Court's unnecessarily narrow reading of the
Medicaid statute will force many indigent women to have children
they would not otherwise have, thus causing insurmountable financial and emotional problems. This decision is, therefore, contrary to the statute's fundamental purpose of promoting the best
interests of recipients. 74
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE

In Maher v. Roe, 75 the Supreme Court considered whether a
Connecticut Welfare Department regulation violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. This regulation allowed for the provision of funding for two methods of pregnancy
termination, therapeutic abortion and live birth, while denying
Medicaid benefits for elective abortions during the first trimes66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
supra.

See text accompanying notes 26-51 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 38 & 39 supra.
See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
See Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S.Ct. 2366 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
See Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 2376 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977). For the procedural history of this case, see note 32
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ter. 76 This regulatory scheme therefore created two classes of indigent pregnant women; these two classes are indistinguishable,
except that pregnancies are terminated by different methods and
that one class is granted pregnancy-related medical assistance,
whereas the other is not.
Equal protection analysis has traditionally followed a twotiered approach; either a rational basis or a strict scrutiny test is
applied. 77 Legislative classifications which are based on a suspect
class 78 or which impinge upon a fundamental right 79 are strictly
scrutinized; such classifications will be upheld only if they further
a "compelling state interest." All other classifications are valid if a
mere rational relationship between the classification and a legitimate state objective is found. 80 This two-tiered approach involves
opposite extremes. A rational relationship between a legislative
classification and a legitimate state interest can usually be found.
On the other hand, few classifications can be said to further a compelling governmental interest. 81
Although Justice Powell, again writing for the majority, described this two-tiered method for determining the validity of legislative classifications as "well-settled," 8 2 the Burger Court has frequently indicated dissatisfaction with this mode of equal protection
76. See Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2378 & n.2 (1977).
77. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14
(1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1077-87 (1969).
78. Suspect classifications are based on immutable characteristics present at
birth, such as race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); national origin,
see, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948); alienage, see, e.g., Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). While a plurality of the Court has voted to
make sex a suspect class, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a majority of
the Court has never accepted this proposition.
79. The right to travel was deemed fundamental in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969). Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972), declared the
right to vote to be fundamental. The right to privacy was declared fundamental in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965). Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), established that marriage is a fundamental right.
80. Cf. cases cited note 77 supra (discussing two-tiered analysis).
81. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a Japanese-American for violating a military
order during World War II which excluded all such persons from the west coast and
removed them to relocation camps. The Court upheld the conviction, even though
the order created a classification based on race which was "immediately suspect."
Id. at 216.
82. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2380 (1977).
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analysis. This Court has often required more state justification than

did the Warren Court to pass the rational basis test.8 3 Moreover,

strict scrutiny analysis has been reduced in importance, as demonstrated by the Burger Court's refusal to recognize new fundamental rights8 4 and suspect classifications. 85

The rigidity of the two-tiered approach often leads to undesirable results. The distinctions between suspect and nonsuspect
classes and between fundamental and nonfundamental rights involve opposite extremes. However, many classes and rights do not
easily fit into one of these categories, as evidenced by the holdings
that the right to travel is fundamental, 8 6 while the rights to educa-

tion87 and decent housing are not.8 8 Thus, classifications that discriminate on the basis of such "nonsuspect" classes as poverty or
illegitimacy8 9 or impinge upon a right that is important, although

not deemed fundamental, 90 are generally upheld under rational
basis analysis.

Justice Marshall has advocated replacing the two-tiered test
with an equal protection analysis which weighs " 'the importance of
the governmental benefits denied, the character of the class, and
the asserted state interests.' "91 This approach is superior to the
two-tiered mode of equal protection analysis, because it does not
83. See, e.g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
84. The Supreme Court has rejected the notions that fundamental rights include decent housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), or education, San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
85. The Supreme Court has refused to define suspect classes to include illegitimates, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), or the poor, Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945,
951-52 (1975); Note, Doe v. Beal: Abortion, Medicaid, and Equal Protection, 62 VA.
L. REv. 811, 825-26 (1976).
86. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
87. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
88. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
89. See note 85 supra.
90. See note 84 supra.
91. Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 2396 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322 (1976)). See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-27 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-27 (1970) (Marshall, J.,dissenting). For other intermediate tests, see Goodpaster, The Constitutional and Fundamental Rights, 15 Asuz. L. REv. 479 (1973); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword;In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Wilkinson, supra note 85;
Note, Doe v. Beal: Abortion, Medicaid, and Equal Protection,supra note 85.
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determine the validity of a classification based on whether a class
or right fits into one of two rigid and extreme categorizations. Instead, all relevant factors are considered in conjunction with each
other. This analysis differs significantly from the analysis used by
the Court. Once a determination regarding the suspect nature of a
class is made under the two-tiered analysis, the nature of the class
is no longer considered. Similarly, once it has been determined
whether or not a right interfered with is fundamental, the nature of
the right is no longer relevant. Thus, it is possible for classifications
that discriminate on the basis of poverty or illegitimacy,9" or impinge upon important although not fundamental rights, 93 to be upheld under rational basis analysis even though they further only a
minor state interest. In addition, two-tiered analysis does not consider the nature of the class discriminated against and the right
impinged upon in conjunction with each other. Thus, a classification that both discriminates against a class in need of protection,
but not deemed suspect, and impinges upon an important, although not fundamental right, could be upheld when balanced
against an insignificant state interest under the rational basis test.
These undesirable results are avoided by considering the nature of
the class discriminated against and the right impinged upon in conjunction with the asserted state interest. This analysis would only
uphold a classification that discriminates against a class in need of
protection, but not deemed suspect, and/or impinges upon an important, but not fundamental right, if the state interest justifies the
undesirable results of the classification.
Once the Court in Maher asserted that the two-tiered approach was the applicable mode of analysis to resolve the issues
in question, it followed the procedure dictated by this analysis.
First, the Court considered whether the legislative classification
under attack involved a suspect class. Citing Dandridge v. Williams,94 the Court asserted, without further discussion, that the
poor are not a suspect class. 95 Then, the Court discussed whether
92. See note 85 supra.
93. See note 84 supra.
94. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

95. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2381 (1977) (citing Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970)). Although poverty has not been deemed a suspect classification,
Justice Powell's majority opinion in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), articulated a special test for determining the validity of a
classification based on wealth. This test would invalidate a classification which discriminates against those individuals who have "two distinguishing characteristics:
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the Connecticut regulation " 'impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.' "96 The
three-judge district court below found that the denial of funding for
elective abortions, coupled with the provision of funding for therapeutic abortions and prenatal and postnatal care, "weights the
choice of the pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right to an elective abortion." 97 A woman's
decision is "affected not simply by the absence of payment for
the abortion, but by the availability of public funds for childbirth if
she chooses not to have the abortion."9 8 This regulatory scheme
was seen as an infringement upon a woman's fundamental right to
choose between the two methods of pregnancy termination, live

birth and abortion. 99
because of their impecunity they [are] completely unable to pay for some desired
benefit, and as a consequence, they [sustain] an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit." Id. at 20. In a dissenting opinion to the three
cases under discussion in this note, Justice Marshall argued that the denial of
Medicaid for nontherapeutic abortions would be struck down under this test, as
"Medicaid recipients are, almost by definition, 'completely unable to pay for' abortions, and are thereby completely denied 'a meaningful opportunity' to obtain them."
Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2397 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
That a classification discriminates against indigents has influenced other Su-

preme Court decisions which found denials of equal protection. See, e.g., James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
96. See Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2380 (1977) (quoting San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
97. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (D. Conn. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977) (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 663-64.
99. See id. at 664. Other courts have described the nature of this infringement
in stronger terms. E.g., Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976), asserted
that the inability of Medicaid recipients to afford an elective abortion suggests that
funding live births and therapeutic abortions, while denying funding for elective
abortions, not only weights a woman's choice against choosing an elective abortion
but effectively eliminates her ability to choose abortion. Id. at 1074. Similarly, the
Third Circuit in Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366
(1977), asserted that the state has "'forcedthe pregnant woman to use the least voluntary method of treatment." Id. at 619 (emphasis added). The abolition of a woman's
right to choose abortion was also stressed in Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center,
347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), where the court suggested that an indigent pregnant woman is advised "that the state will deny her medical assistance unless she
resigns her freedom of choice and bears the child." Id. at 500 (emphasis added),
Accord, McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Roe v. Norton, 408 F.
Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977); Doe
v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal,
523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F.
Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
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The court below relied on the Supreme Court holdings in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 10 0 Dunn v. Blumstein, 10 1 and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County10 2 to reach its conclusion. At issue in
Shapiro was a Connecticut one-year residency requirement for welfare assistance. This requirement raised equal protection problems
because it created "two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents
who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who
have resided less than a year ..... 103 The strict scrutiny test was
triggered because the latter class's fundamental right to travel was
impinged upon by the statutory requirement. The state interests
asserted in support of the classification were the need to save fiscal
expenditures and to maintain an orderly welfare system;' 0 4 these
enough to justify
interests, however, were deemed not 10compelling
5
right.
fundamental
a
with
interference
A durational residency requirement for the right to vote was
challenged in Dunn. The Supreme Court found that a residency

requirement which divided citizens into two classes, old and new
residents, and which denied the latter class the right to vote, impinged upon two fundamental rights: the right to vote and the right
to travel. 10 6 Although the residency requirement only penalized,
rather than eliminated, the right to travel, the right was still infringed. The Court declared: " '[A] State may not impose a penalty
upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
"Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be
...
indirectly denied" . . . ."107 Neither the state's interest in
insuring the purity of the ballot box nor its interest in insuring
voter knowledgeability were considered reasons adequately compelling to satisfy the strict scrutiny test.' 08
Memorial Hospital involved an Arizona statute which conditioned free nonemergency medical care for indigents on one-year
residence in the county. The Court found that the "'constitutional

100. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
101.
102.
103.

405 U.S. 330 (1972).
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).

104. Id. at 634-38.
105. Id. at 638.
106.
107.

See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972)
Id. at 341 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965)) (foot-

note omitted).
108. See id. at 345, 360.
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right of interstate migration' "109 was penalized because its exercise
was conditioned on the forfeiture of medical care, which the Court
characterized as a "basic necessity of life."' 1 0 Relying on Shapiro
and Dunn, the Court in Memorial Hospital held that a classification
which penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right must further a
compelling state interest."' Because the Arizona statute at issue
did not pass this strict scrutiny test, it was declared unconstitu1 12
tional.
Memorial Hospital, Dunn, and Shapiro are relevant to the
issue of Medicaid funding of abortions. The class of indigent
women who elect to terminate their pregnancies are penalized for
exercising this right by the regulation at issue in Maher, because
they must forfeit pregnancy-related medical assistance. Indeed,
their right to choose abortion as a means of pregnancy termination
can be said to be eliminated, rather than merely penalized."1 3 Thus,
strict scrutiny of the legislative classification in the instant case is
particularly appropriate.
However, the Supreme Court in Maher held that the Shapiro
and Memorial Hospital penalty analysis was not applicable.1" 4 The
court found "only a semantic difference between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly interferes with a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy and their assertion that it
penalizes the exercise of that right.""15 The Court analogized
penalties to sanctions imposed by the criminal law. The denial of
welfare benefits to those who had recently exercised their right to
travel to another state was deemed similar to a criminal sanction so
as to warrant strict scrutiny."16 However, Maher was distinguishable from Shapiro and Memorial Hospital because Connecticut did
not deny "general welfare benefits to all women who had obtained
abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits. '""17 The
Court asserted that such a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro
would be required before strict scrutiny would be appropriate. 1" 8
109. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974) (quoting
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (separate opinion of Brennan, J., White,

J., and Marshall, J.)).
110. See id. at 259-60 (footnote omitted).
111. See id. at 258.
112. See id. at 269.
113. See text accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra.
114. See Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 2383 n.8 (1977).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
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Moreover, the majority reasoned that just as the right to travel
interstate is not penalized by the refusal to pay for it, the state
does not penalize the choice to have an abortion by refusing to pay
for it. 119

The flaws inherent in this analysis are apparent. In Shapiro the
Court emphasized that a regulation which deters or interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right is unconstitutional unless supported by a compelling state interest.120 A penalty was distinguished from deterrence in Dunn:
Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually
deterred travel. Nor have other "right to travel" cases in this
Court always relied on the presence of actual deterrence. In
Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling-state-interest
test would be triggered by "any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] ....1,21
This clarification of the meaning of Shapiro was designed to
broaden, rather than narrow, the application of the strict scrutiny
test. In essence, Dunn asserted that a regulation does not even
have to deter the exercise of a fundamental right to trigger strict
scrutiny. Rather, if a regulation merely penalizes one who exercises a fundamental right, the strict scrutiny test applies. Thus,
Maher's analogy of a penalty to a criminal sanction is inappropriate.
Maher recognized that the regulation at issue would make it difficult, if not impossible, for indigent women to exercise their fundamental right to choose abortion. 12 2 Thus, the Connecticut regulation not only penalizes, but actually deters, the exercise of a
constitutional right. Strict scrutiny is therefore particularly appropriate.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon a fundamental right. This finding was
reached by considering a woman's interest in choosing abortion in
conjunction with the nature of the state's interference with such
choice. 12 3 In effect, the Court used a balancing test similar to that
proposed by Justice Marshall.1 24 However, while Justice Marshall's
test may be used to determine the validity of a legislative classifica119.
120.
121.
phasis in
122.
123.
124.

See id.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972) (footnote omitted) (emoriginal) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)).
See Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2383 (1977).
See id. at 2382.
See text accompanying note 91 supra.
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tion, the Court's test was used merely to determine whether the
right to choose abortion had been sufficiently interfered with so as
to trigger strict scrutiny. The Court in Maher deemed this test
appropriate because it believed that the right recognized in Wade
25
is only impinged upon by "unduly burdensome" interference. 1
This view is based on the recognition in Wade that the state
has an interest in protecting potential human life. The Court in
Beal asserted that this interest exists "throughout the course of the
woman's pregnancy."' 126 The Court in Beal read Wade to hold that

the point at which this interest becomes sufficiently compelling to
justify interfering with the abortion decision depends upon the nature of the interference. However, Wade prevents the state's interest in potential life from justifying any regulation of the abortion
decision prior to viability, as such regulation only "has both logical
and biological justifications" at this point. 127 In addition, under the
holding in Wade, only narrowly circumscribed regulation of the
abortion decision is permissible. For example, abortions can be
regulated, and even proscribed, to protect the state's interest in
potential human life only after viability, and only if the life or
health of the mother is not endangered by the pregnancy. 12 8 Regulations aimed at promoting maternal health are only permissible
during the second and third trimesters. The types of regulation
Wade deemed permissible to promote maternal health during the
second and third trimesters constitute very minor interferences,
which indicates that the limitations imposed by the decision apply
to any regulation of the abortion decision, not just to unduly burdensome interferences, as the Court in Maher asserted.
The regulation at issue in Maher does not satisfy the standards
established in Wade. It interferes with the abortion decision during
the first and second trimesters, without promoting maternal health.
Maher nevertheless sanctioned the regulation as it deemed the
criteria established in Wade inapplicable to regulations which do
not unduly burden the right to choose abortion.' 29 By misreading
Wade, the Court in Maher avoided invalidating the regulations on
constitutional grounds. A correct reading would compel the opposite result.
125. See Maher v. Roe, 97,S. Ct. 2376, 2383 (1977).
126. Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2372 (1977).
127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). See also text accompanying notes
62 & 63 supra.
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
129. The conclusion that the regulations at issue in Maher do not unduly burden the right to choose abortion is faulty. See text accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra.
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Maher found the regulation at issue not sufficiently burdensome to impinge upon the fundamental right to choose abortion by
balancing the state's interest in potential life against the woman's
interest in choosing how to terminate her pregnancy. Therefore,
strict scrutiny was not invoked. This finding was based primarily on
the Court's interpretation of the state's decision to fund childbirth,
while denying funding to elective abortion, to encourage childbirth. i3o Thus, the purported state interest in potential human life,
which can also be seen as an interest in promoting normal
childbirth, provided support for the regulation at issue. The Court
particularly emphasized that the state did not erect a direct obstacle to choosing abortion, but rather made the alternative choice of
childbirth much more attractive. Indeed, the Court observed that
Connecticut placed no obstacles "in the pregnant women's path to
abortion" that were not already there. 131
This reasoning suggests that preventing women from exercising their constitutional right to choose abortion is permissible if
done indirectly. However, the means chosen by the legislature had
particular significance for the Court. Maher embraced the view that
the state should have broad power to "encourage actions deemed
to be in the public interest."132 Thus, the distinction between encouraging an "activity consonant with legislative policy,"1 33 such as
normal childbirth, and directly interfering with a protected activity,1 34 for example, by prohibiting abortion, is important. The for-

mer type of state action is protected, for it involves what the Court
believed to be the state prerogative of promoting what the legislature considers to be in the public interest. The latter mode of state
action, on the other hand, lacks the positive element of state encouragement of a favored activity, and merely involves interference
with constitutionally protected activity. Thus, the Court will protect fundamental rights only from direct prevention of their exercise. However, because it is within the state's prerogative to promote the public interest by encouraging certain activities, if a right
is interfered with indirectly by state encouragement of alternative activity deemed to be in the public interest, less constitutional scrutiny will be applied. Therefore, in cases involving the
fundamental right to choose abortion, strict scrutiny will only be
130. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2382 (1977).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2383.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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invoked if the state creates a classification which directly interferes
with that right. 135 This reasoning directly opposes the declaration
in Dunn v. Blumstein' 36 that " 'Constitutional rights would be of
little value if they could be .. . indirectly denied'.... "137
The failure of the Court to apply strict scrutiny simply because
the Connecticut regulation imposed an indirect barrier to the right
to choose abortion also ignores practical realities. The Court itself
acknowledged that without Medicaid funding for abortion indigency "may make it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions.' 138 Therefore, Maher
avoided strictly scrutinizing a legislative classification that infringed
upon a fundamental right because the Court focused on the
method used by the state to interfere with the right established in
Wade, rather than on the practical result of this interference.
After finding that the classification at issue in Maher was not
subject to strict scrutiny, the rational basis test was applied.139 The
distinction in the Connecticut regulation between childbirth and
elective abortion was found to relate rationally to the constitutionally permissible purpose of encouraging normal childbirth. 140 That
this interest is legitimate throughout the pregnancy was supported
by statements in Wade that the state's interest in protecting the
potential life of the fetus grows " 'in substantiality as the woman
approaches term,' "141 and that the pregnant woman " 'cannot be
isolated in her privacy.' "142 However, these statements were dicta,
meant only to support the state's compelling interest in the potential life of the fetus after viability. The Court in Wade emphasized
that this interest could not justify interference with the abortion
decision prior to viability. 1" Thus, Maher's conclusion that the
state has an "unquestionably.

..

encouraging normal childbirth'"

'strong and legitimate interest in
144

throughout the pregnancy is

135. E.g., A Missouri consent requirement for the procurement of an abortion
was declared unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

This requirement was invalidated because it constituted "an absolute obstacle" to a
woman's right to choose how to terminate her pregnancy. See id. at 70 n.l1.
136. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
137. Id. at 341 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965)).
138. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2383 (1977).

139. See id. at 2385.
140. See id.
141. Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973)).
142. Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973)).
143. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
144. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2385 (1977) (quoting Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct.
2366, 2372 (1977)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss2/6

20

Felder:
Medicaid Funding for Abortions: The Medicaid Statute and the Equa
MEDICAID FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS

1978]

based on the Court's misreading of Wade. Nevertheless, the Court
continued this argument by noting:
The medical costs associated with childbirth are substantial, and
have increased significantly in recent years. As recognized by the
District Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater
than those normally associated with elective abortions during the
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth is a
rational means of encouraging childbirth. 145
However, denying Medicaid funding for elective abortion while
providing it for childbirth is not a rational means of protecting potential life by encouraging childbirth, because such a regulation
only encourages a narrow class of people to carry their fetuses to
term, that is, women who cannot afford abortions.
The Court dismissed the notion that its holding could be seen
as "unsympathetic to the plight of an indigent woman who desires
an abortion"'146 by the meager assertion that "' the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic
ill.' "147 Citing Dandridge, the Court also emphasized the wide

latitude given the states in "choosing among competing demands
for limited public funds.' i 48 This latitude exists even though the
"'most basic needs of impoverished human beings' "149 are involved. Yet reliance on Dandridge is particularly inappropriate,
given that abortion is a less costly medical procedure than

childbirth.'

50

Thus, the state's fiscal integrity would be preserved

by funding abortions.

Application of Justice Marshall's equal protection analysis' 5 ' to
the regulations at issue in these cases would result in invalidation
of the regulations. In dissent, Justice Marshall characterized the
benefits denied in Beal and Maher as "of absolutely vital importance in the lives of the recipients."1 52 Without public financing for
nontherapeutic abortions, a poor woman will be forced either to
risk her life by undergoing an illegal abortion or give birth to an
unwanted child and thereby "give up all chance of escaping the

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,74 (1972)).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970)).
See Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2371 (1977).
See text accompanying note 91 supra.
Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 2396 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cycle of poverty."' 153 Justice Marshall asserted that worthy of consideration is that the class affected by this denial is poor, although
he acknowledged that poverty does not constitute a suspect
class. 154 He further observed that minority women will be most
strongly affected by the denial. 1 55 The asserted state interest was
measured against these considerations. This interest was described
by the Court as a" 'strong interest in protecting the potential life of
the fetus.' "156 However, Justice Marshall cited the assertion in
Doe v. Bolton,157 the companion case to Wade, that no state interest can justify interference with the abortion decision during the
first trimester to refute this aspect of the majority opinion. 15 8 He
further asserted: "If there is any state interest in potential life before the point of viability, it certainly does not outweigh the deprivation or serious discouragement of a vital constitutional right of
especial importance to poor and minority women." 159 Therefore,
under Justice Marshall's flexible equal protection analysis, the regulations at issue would be invalid. Finally, Justice Marshall charged
that the majority invoked the traditional two-tiered equal protection
approach so as to test the Connecticut regulation under a rational
basis analysis. 160 In his opinion, application of this test " 'leaves
little doubt about the outcome; the challenged legislation is
always upheld." '161
CONCLUSION

Two recent Supreme Court decisions have resolved statutory
and constitutional challenges to state regulations which restrict a
woman's right to choose abortion. In Beal v. Doe, 16 2 the Court
held that the Medicaid statute does not require, but allows, participating states to provide Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic

153. Id. at 2397 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also text accompanying notes 94 & 95
supra.
155. See Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2397 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 2398 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376,
2385 (1977)).
157. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
158. Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 2398 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192-200 (1973)).

159. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
160. See id. at 2396 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
162. 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
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abortions. In Beal the Court found the regulation at issue to be
both consistent with Title XIX of the Social Security Act and a
reasonable means to encourage childbirth, which is a legitimate
state interest. The Court also held in Maher v. Roe 163 that the
failure to provide Medicaid funding for elective abortions, while
extending it to therapeutic abortions and live births, does not constitute a denial of equal protection. The Court in Maher construed
Wade and other precedent to support the proposition that only unduly burdensome and direct interference with the right to choose
abortion constitutes an infringement of that fundamental right, and
that strict scrutiny would only be appropriate in such cases. The
regulation at issue in Maher was seen as encouraging childbirth, an
activity deemed to be in the public interest, rather than as a direct
obstacle to a woman's ability to choose abortion. This led to the
validation of the regulation, because it was found to "rationally relate" to the "legitimate state interest" of encouraging normal
childbirth.
By holding that strict scrutiny will only apply to unduly burdensome state action, the Supreme Court has severely diminished
the privacy right established in Wade. This conclusion is especially
true given that the Court did not consider the denial of Medicaid
funding for elective abortions an undue burden on the right to
choose abortion, while funding for therapeutic abortions and live
births was permitted. Only a criminal prohibition, such as the
statute invalidated in Wade, is a more severe burden on this right.
Thus, the decision in Maher indicates that most state interferences
with a woman's constitutionally protected right to choose abortion
will now be subject to rational basis analysis, rather than to strict
scrutiny. The application of such an analysis will undoubtedly result in upholding abortion regulations if the Court continues to
misread Wade, as it did in Beal and Maher, to suggest that the
state's interest in encouraging childbirth can justify regulating the
abortion decision throughout the pregnancy. Thus, the rational
basis standard is easily met. The decisions under discussion subvert the principles established in Wade to the disadvantage of indigent women.
Andrea Bayer Felder
163.

97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
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